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Introduction
In markets with repeated purchases …rms frequently use the consumers'purchase history to quote di¤erent prices to their own previous customers and to those who bought from a rival before. When price discrimination is permitted and trade among consumers is not feasible, …rms may want to price low to poach their rival's customers and price high to their own customers. This form of price discrimination, termed behavior-based price discrimination (henceforth BBPD), sometimes also called price discrimination based on purchase history or dynamic pricing, is widely observed in many markets. In the communications markets, for instance, …rms frequently o¤er a lower price to a customer who has been using a competitor's service. Similar pricing strategies are employed in other markets such as supermarkets, web retailers, credit cards, banking services and electricity and gas.
1 Although this type of competitive price discrimination has received much attention in the economics literature in recent years, 2 the literature has hitherto focused on the assumption that …rms do no react to the rivals'poaching o¤ers. Interestingly, in some of the markets where …rms often discriminate between their own and the rivals'consumers, the use of retention o¤ers as an attempt to avoid customer poaching and switching has become a widespread business practice. A recent report by the regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industries (Ofcom, 2010) refers that retention o¤ers have been increasingly used by …rms operating in markets in which the switching process is the Losing Provider Led (LPL). The LPL regime is currently in place in the UK for switching mobile telephony or broadband services and operates as follows. Consumers wishing to switch their mobile telephony services must contact their existing provider and request a Porting Authorization Code (PAC) which they must communicate to their new provider in order to complete the switch. 3 The same procedure also applies for switching broadband services, in which case the required code is the Migrations Authorization Code (MAC).
1 A recent report by the O¢ ce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem (2008) ), the regulator for Britain's gas and electricity industries, has revealed that, in this industry: (i) a substantial fraction of consumers are 'switchers'in the sense that they constantly seek out for the best deal in the market; and (ii) suppliers are well aware of these consumers'dynamics and do take them into account in their pricing decisions. In particular, "companies charge more to existing ("sticky") customers whilst maintaining competitiveness in more price sensitive segments of the market. 2 Chen (2005) , Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and Esteves (2009b) present updated literature surveys on BBPD. 3 For mobile services a PAC code is required only when the consumer wants to keep his existing telephone number when switching to the new provider. Therefore, apart from being able to know whether or not a consumer purchased from a rival before, …rms can have the tools to price discriminate between di¤erent types of old customers those disclosing a desire to switch (called active consumers) and those showing no intention to switch (called passive consumers). Empowered with this additional information …rms can have the last word over their competitors' poaching o¤ers. The consumer's request of a code discloses information about his willingness to switch and gives …rms an incentive to use retention o¤ers targeted to customers who are at a risk of switching. Theoretically …rms can use diverse forms of retention o¤ers price discounts, price matching, upgrade of services as a way to make it less attractive for a customer to switch to a competing …rm. However, according to the Ofcom report (2010, p.82) retention activity in the UK communications industry is generally in the form of a price discount.
The ability of …rms to employ retention strategies will make it more di¢ cult for …rms to attract the rivals'customers and will potentially raise welfare and antitrust concerns. Some interesting issues are the following. What is the likely impact of retention on competition and consumers? Do …rms charge "excessive prices" to passive consumers? Does BBPD with retention o¤ers enhance the dominance of the …rm with a higher customer base? Who bene…ts and who loses when …rms engage in BBPD with retention o¤ers? Should these business practices be banned?
Despite the crucial importance of these issues, the answer to these and other related questions is not yet known. This paper takes a …rst step in investigating the competitive and welfare e¤ects of retention o¤ers in markets where …rms engage in BBPD. The paper considers a two-period model with two horizontally di¤erentiated …rms competing for consumers with stable exogenous brand preferences across the two periods. These preferences are speci…ed in the Hotelling-style linear market of unit length with …rms positioned at the endpoints. Firms cannot commit to future prices. In the …rst-period …rms charge a uniform price. In the second-period there are two stages. In the …rst stage, …rms use the consumers' …rst period purchase history to draw inferences about their preferences and price accordingly. Each …rm simultaneously chooses a price to its old customers and to the rival's previous customers. In the second stage, it is assumed that a retention discount is targeted at consumers expressing an intention to leave and is enabled by a switching process in which a provider is made aware of a customer's intention to switch before the switching takes place (LPL process).
In order to investigate e¤ects of retention o¤ers when …rms also employ BBPD, I …rst present the benchmark case where BBPD is permitted but retention o¤ers are not allowed, either because they are not permitted or because …rms cannot recognize the customers 3 who are at risk of switching. This benchmark is useful to understand the competitive and welfare implications of BBPD in markets operating under di¤erent switching regimes. With regard to the communications sector, the Ofcom report states that an alternative to the LPL switching regime, also in place in the UK, is the Gaining Provider Led (GPL) process which applies, for instance, to switching …xed telephony lines. Under the GPL regime, the consumer agrees a deal with the new provider before the losing provider is informed that the switch is in process. In contrast to the LPL regime, the GPL switching process does not allow …rms to target counter-o¤ers to consumers willing to switch because by the time the existing provider becomes aware of the consumer's intention to switch, the consumer has already signed the contract with a competitor.
The second-period static analysis sheds some light on the price e¤ects of BBPD with retention counter-o¤ers given an inherit market share. I show that …rms will only engage in BBPD with retention o¤ers when their customer base is above a threshold, i.e., when it is higher than 33%. The analysis also sheds light on whether or not BBPD with retention strategies can help a dominant …rm (with a market share above 50%) to maintain its dominance. The model predicts that when BBPD is permitted but retention o¤ers are not allowed, the dominant …rm will lose its dominance under BBPD. A similar result is obtained in Gehrig et al. (2013) . In contrast, if BBPD and retention o¤ers are both permitted the model predicts that when the dominant …rm is big enough, i.e., with a market share above 75%, although BBPD with retention activity reduces its dominance the …rm can still maintain the dominant position (i.e., a market share above 50%).
While the static analysis is a useful tool, the dynamic analysis is the most appropriate to advise competition authorities. The paper shows that BBPD with retention o¤ers gives rise to new dynamic e¤ects. While under BBPD with no retention, the …rst-period equilibrium price is above the non-discrimination level, the reverse happens under BBPD with retention discounts. Regarding the second-period equilibrium prices, compared to a GPL regime with BBPD and no retention prices, the model predicts that the LPL regime with BBPD and retention leads to higher prices to all consumers that do not switch, be they passive consumers or consumers that were successfully retained after they expressed a desire to switch by requesting a code.
The welfare analysis shows that industry pro…ts are lower and consumers'surplus and welfare are higher under the LPL regime with BBPD and retention o¤ers than under the GPL with BBPD and no retention. The reason is that the lower second period prices for those consumers that switch and the decrease in the …rst-period price for all consumers more than compensate the higher prices for those consumers that do not switch. Retention o¤ers boost welfare because the number of consumers who switch away from their preferred 4 product is lower than in the case where retention activity is absent. This paper is related to the literature on competitive price discrimination, 4 especially the literature on behavior-based price discrimination. 5 Like other forms of price discrimination, BBPD can raise competition and welfare concerns. While in the switching cost approach purchase history discloses information about exogenous switching costs (e.g. Chen (1997) and Taylor (2003) ), in the brand preference approach purchase history discloses information about a consumer's exogenous brand preference for a …rm (e.g. VillasBoas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) ). A common …nding in this literature is that BBPD tends to intensify competition, potentially bene…t consumers and reduce pro…ts in duopoly models where (i) the market exhibits best response asymmetry, 6 (ii) …rms are symmetric and (iii) both have information to price discriminate (e.g. Chen (1997) , VillasBoas (1999) , Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , Taylor (2003) and Esteves (2010) ). There are, however, some models where …rms can bene…t from BBPD. This can be the case when …rms are asymmetric (e.g. Sha¤er and Zhang (2000)), when …rms'targetability is imperfect and asymmetric (Chen et al. (2001) ) and when only one of the two …rms has information to price discriminate (Chen and Zhang (2009) and Esteves (2009) ). Finally, the paper is related to Gehrig et al. (2012) who investigate the e¤ects of BBPD in a static asymmetric duopoly model, where one of the …rms is assumed to have an inherited dominant market position (market share larger than 50%). They show that uniform pricing is a more powerful instrument than BBPD for the dominant …rm to defend its market share advantage.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the benchmark case where …rms can employ BBPD but retention o¤ers are not allowed. Section 4 presents the equilibrium analysis and Section 5 provides the welfare analysis. Section 6 concludes and the appendix collects the proofs that were omitted from the text. 4 Comprehensive surveys on competitive price discrimination are presented by Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2007) .
5 Chen (2005) , Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and Esteves (2009b) present updated literature surveys on BBPD. 6 Following , the market exhibits best response asymmetry when one …rm's "strong" market is the other's "weak" market. 7 For other recent papers on BBPD and customer recognition see also Pearcy (2010), Esteves and Vasconcelos (2014) , Esteves and Reggiani (2014) , Gehrig et al (2011 Gehrig et al ( ), (2012 , Shy and Stenbacka (2013) .
2 Model
Two …rms A and B produce at zero marginal cost nondurable goods A and B. 8 There are two periods, 1 and 2. The total number of consumers in the market is normalized to one. In each period, each consumer wishes to buy a single unit from either …rm A or B and is willing to pay at most v: The reservation value v is su¢ ciently high so that nobody stays out of the market. Like in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) consumers have exogenous preferences for brands that are present from the start. Consumer preferences are speci…ed in the Hotelling-style linear market of unit length with …rms positioned at the endpoints. A consumer brand preference, ; is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and is …xed over the two periods of consumption. 9 A consumer located at incurs total cost p A + t when buying from …rm A at price p A , and incurs total cost p B + t(1 ) when buying from B at price p B . In the brand preference approach t > 0 measures how much a consumer dislikes buying a less preferred brand.
Firms are not able to observe the brand preference of individual consumers. However, in the second-period, each …rm can use the information about consumers' …rst period purchase decisions to infer whether they prefer its brand or the rival's one and price accordingly. In the …rst-period price discrimination is not feasible, therefore each …rm sets a single price. Suppose that at any pair of …rst-period prices such that all consumers purchase and both …rms have positive sales, there will be a …rst-period cuto¤ 1 such that all consumers on the interval [0; 1 ] buy from A and all consumers on the interval [ 1 ; 1] buy from …rm B. When …rms cannot commit to future prices, in the second period, each …rm will o¤er one price to its own past customers and a di¤erent one to those who purchased from their rival before (or, new customers).
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Now I extend the body of the literature on BBPD by assuming that in the secondperiod there is a two-stage competition game. Like in the extant models, in the …rst stage, each …rm simultaneously chooses a price to its own past customers, p o i ; and a price to the new customers, p n i ; i = A; B: After consumers have observed its current supplier price, p o i ; and the new supplier price, p n j ; some of them might be willing to switch. As aforementioned, under a LPL switching regime, consumers with an intention to switch 8 The assumption of zero marginal costs can be relaxed without altering the basic nature of the results derived throughout the model. 9 For a model of BBPD with imperfect correlated preferences across periods see Chen and Pearcy (2010) . 10 Because we are assumingg that all consumers buy in period 1 and that no new customers enter the market in period 2, a customer who bought from …rm j in period 1 is a new customer to …rm i in period 2.
6 must go through a validation process with its existing supplier, a proof of which must be provided to the new supplier in order to complete the switch. This creates an opportunity for …rms to segment their customers base between those who are willing to switch and those who are not, and try to retain the …rst group of consumers before they can sign any agreement with a competitor. Retention strategies are used as an attempt to make it less attractive for a customer to switch to a rival …rm. Although …rms may use diverse forms of retention o¤ers e.g., price discounts, price matching, upgrade of services this paper focuses only on retention activity in the form of a …xed price discount targeted to a consumer expressing an intention to switch. Thus, in the second stage, it is assumed that each …rm o¤ers each customer disclosing an intention to leave (e.g, by requesting a PAC or MAC) 11 a secret …xed discount named d i : Moreover, it is assumed that consumers do not blu¤, i.e., only those consumers with economic reasons to switch will disclose their willingness to switch to the current supplier. Firms and consumers use the same discount factor :
BBPD with no retention
Consider …rst the benchmark in which BBPD is permitted but retention o¤ers are not allowed in period 2. This may occur either because the switching process in place does not allow …rms to distinguish, in their base of previous customers, those who are looking to switch (active consumers) and those who are not (passive consumers); or because retention o¤ers are not permitted. Throughout the analysis, it is considered that active customers are those who show an intention to switch by requesting, for instance, a code to complete the switching; while passive customers are those who are not willing to switch (with strong preferences for a given …rm). As mentioned in the Introduction, with regard to the UK communications sector, an alternative to the losing provider led (LPL) switching regime, is the gaining provider led (GPL) process which applies, for instance, to switching …xed telephony lines. In contrast to the LPL, the GPL regime does not allow …rms to make countero¤ers to consumers willing to switch because by the time the existing provider becomes aware of the consumer's intention to switch, the consumer has already signed the contract with a competitor. 11 In the UK consumers wishing to switch their mobile telephony services must contact their existing provider and request a Porting Authorisation Code (PAC) which they must communicate to the new provider in order to complete the switch. The same procedure is applied for switching broadband services, in which case the required code is the Migrations Authorisation Code (MAC).
This benchmark is useful to advise competition policy agencies with regard to (i) the competitive and welfare implications of BBPD in markets operating under di¤erent switching regimes and (ii) the likely impact of retention o¤ers on prices, pro…ts and consumer welfare in comparison to the case where this practice is forbidden or not feasible.
The analysis of BBPD with no retention strategies (under the GPL switching regime) is based on the simpli…ed version of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) with consumer preferences uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1].
Let the superscript N R denote no retention.
Proposition 1. When …rms can price discriminate between old and new customers but retention o¤ers are not allowed, second period equilibrium prices are:
(ii) If
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to shed some light about the impact of BBPD when …rms depart with an inherited exogenous base of customers, let s The previous corollary shows that if …rms depart with an equal base of customers, they will share equally the market in period 2. In contrast, if …rms depart with asymmetric inherited market shares, then BBPD with no retention destroys the dominance of the larger …rm. Speci…cally, the smaller …rm will become the leader while the larger …rm will become the smaller one. A similar result is obtained in Gehrig et al. (2012) , who conclude that uniform pricing is a more powerful instrument than BBPD for the dominant …rm to defend its market share advantage. This static analysis will be useful to draw some conclusion about the e¤ects of BBPD in an industry where one of the …rms can use retention o¤ers to defend its dominance. Now look at …rst-period price competition. Let p 1 i represent …rm i's …rst-period price, i = A; B: Following Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) we can established the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When BBPD is permitted and retention is not allowed, there is a symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in which:
(i) First-period equilibrium prices are p ; 1 do not switch and consumers on the interval 
BBPD with retention strategies
As aforementioned I now assume that in the second period apart from being able to distinguish their own previous customers and those who bough from the rival before (new customers), …rms have the tool to recognize, in their base of previous customers, those who are at risk of switching. Firms can now use retention o¤ers as an attempt to make it less attractive for a customer to switch to a competing …rm. We look at retention activity in the form of a price discount o¤ered to a consumer showing an intention to switch. The use of a retention price discount is also a form of price discrimination based on consumers'behavior (in this case the request of a code to complete the switch). This form of retention activity is not price discrimination between old and new customers (as in the existing models of BBPD), but rather between di¤erent types of a …rm's old consumers (those who are willing to switch and those who are not).
With that in mind the game is solved working backward from the second period.
Second-period
Suppose that the …rst period prices lead to a cuto¤ 1 2 [0; 1] such that a consumer located at 1 is indi¤erent between buying from A and B in period 1. With no loss of generality, look at …rm A's turf on [0; 1 ] : Some of …rm A's …rst-period consumers might be willing to switch to B given the observed second period prices fp o A ; p n B g. Under a LPL switching regime, these consumers will need to contact the current provider (…rm A) and request a code (e.g., PAC or MAC) to complete the switching process to …rm B. It is the request of this code that allows …rm A to get back to them with a secret retention price discount d A . Thus, in the second-stage of period 2, the indi¤erent consumer between staying with A after being exposed to a retention campaign and switching to B is located at A , such that
In the group of …rm A's own customers, the indi¤erent consumer between being passive and active is located at c A such that
A similar reasoning is applied to derive the location of the indi¤erent consumer between being passive and active, namely c B in the group of customers who bough from B in period 1, those on the interval
Given the existence of a …rst-period cuto¤, the second-period situation is as depicted in In the second stage …rm A and B solve, respectively, the following problem: 
It is straightforward to obtain that the price discount o¤ered by …rm A and B is, respec-
: With no loss of generality look on …rm A's turf. In the …rst-stage of period 2, …rm A and B solve respectively:
A similar reasoning is applied to …rm B's turf on the interval
Proposition 3. When …rms can employ BBPD and retention o¤ers the second period equilibrium prices and pro…ts are:
(ii) If 
It is interesting to note that a …rms will only employ a retention strategy if its customer base is above a threshold. Considering, for instance, the case of …rm A, we observe that it will only o¤er a retention discount its …rst period market share is larger than : It is also interesting compare the equilibrium retention discount obtained 50% of the second period current price to old customers ; with existing empirical evidence. Considering the Ofcom report (2010, p.82), we …nd that retention discounts generally vary between 32% and 60% of the current price in mobile telephony and between 25% and 44% of the current price in broadband services.
Before proceeding to the analysis of competition in period 1, we next try to draw some conclusions about the competitive e¤ects of BBPD with and without retention in an industry where …rms would depart with an inherited exogenous market share. With no loss of generality consider the case of …rm A. From Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 it is straightforward to obtain the following result. ; while they pay a lower price when 1 > 4 7 . (iii) …rm A's price to new customers with retention strategies is always below its counterpart when this activity is banned. Figure 2 illustrates the second-period equilibrium prices given an inherited market share with and without retention strategies in …rm A's turf A assuming that t = 1. Corollary 2 suggests that it is important to take into account whether one of the …rms has a dominant position in the market when trying to understand the competitive e¤ects of retention o¤ers. Considering for instance the case of …rm A, we observe that its existing consumers pay the same price with and without retention activity when …rm A has a smaller market share, speci…cally when 1 1 4
. At an interior solution (not too strong asymmetry between …rms), we observe that because …rms are able to segment their existing customer base between "active" and "passive" they can charge a much higher price to passive consumers than if retention activity were banned (p o A > p o;N R A ). As said, note that …rms will only try to retain customers when their customer base is above a threshold. Firm A, for instance, will only o¤er retention discounts if 1 > 1 3
: When we move from BBPD with no retention to BBPD with retention we …nd that retained customers are charged a higher price when 1 < 4 7
; while they face a lower price when
. The intuition is the following. When 1 > 1 2 some consumers in …rm A's turf are B-oriented consumers, thus …rm A needs to price more aggressively if it wants to avoid switching. Regarding …rm A's price to new customers (p n A ) we …nd that given …rm B's retention o¤ers, …rm A will need to be more aggressive with their headline price o¤ers (prices for new customers) if it wants to convince customers to switch. Thus, the poaching price (p n ) with retention o¤ers is always below its counterpart when retention is absent. : In contrast, the bigger …rm is able to maintain its dominance when the asymmetry in the market is strong enough. Particularly, it follows that s A . It con…rms the …ndings in Corollary 1 and 3. As seen before the bigger …rm (initial market share higher than 50%) will always lose its dominance under BBPD and no retention. Note also that for any 1 0:5; it is always the case that s 2 A s 2;N R A . In contrast, it is important to stress that when …rms can try to retain their previous clientele, BBPD can help the dominant …rm to maintain its dominance, i.e., BBPD may not destroy the dominance of the bigger …rm. This happens when the initial market share of the bigger …rm is su¢ ciently high (i.e., higher than 75% of the market). If, for instance, …rm A departs with an initial market share of 90%, BBPD with retention activity will reduce its second-period market share to 56%. ), we have that both …rms make the same pro…t in the second period. With retention strategies this is no longer the case because each …rm's pro…t increases with its own initial market share. At the interior solution (   1  3  1  2  3 ) both …rms earn the same pro…t only when they are initially symmetric. For this reason when BBPD with retention discounts are permitted, each …rm has a strategic incentive to build up its …rst-period market share. 
First-period
Next we look at the equilibrium …rst-period pricing and consumption decisions. Because …rms are forward looking they rationally anticipate how today's price decision will a¤ect their second-period pricing and pro…ts. Consumers are also sophisticated in the sense that in equilibrium they correctly anticipate the …rms second-period price discrimination strategies.
Let …rm A's …rst-period price be p 1 A and …rm B's …rst-period price be p 1 B . The marginal consumer in the …rst period will surely switch in the second period to take advantage of the poaching price. If …rst-period prices lead to a cuto¤ 1 ; the consumer located at 1 is indi¤erent between buying from …rm A in period 1 at price p 
Using the expressions for p n A and p n B de…ned in Proposition 3 it follows that
If price discrimination is not permitted or if = 0; then
: Under BBPD with retention strategies we have
while under BBPD with no retention strategies we have
Thus, as long as > 0, with BBPD consumers react less to price reductions in the …rst period than they would in a static model of this kind. Additionally, it is straightforward to see that demand will be less elastic in the …rst period if BBPD is permitted but retention o¤ers are not allowed. Now consider the equilibrium choices of p Substituting equation (10) into equations (12) and (13) it is straightforward to obtain the following proposition. show an intention to switch but are retained, and consumers on the intervals show an intention to leave and do switch in spite of being exposed to a retention o¤er.
(iv) Each …rm's second-period equilibrium pro…t is equal to 13 50 t, while the …rst period equilibrium pro…t equals Proposition 4 highlights that the possibility of …rm engaging in BBPD with retention o¤ers under a LPL switching regime, leads to higher prices to all consumers that do not switch (be they consumers that are not looking to switch or consumers that were successfully retained after they expressed a desire to switch by requesting a code) compared to a GPL process. t > p n;N R = 1 3 t:) In particular, even consumers that obtain a lower price under retention end up paying a higher price than they would in the absence of retention o¤ers under a GPL process. Regarding, the consumers that do switch we …nd that they actually get a lower price in a LPL switching regime with retention o¤ers than they would in the absence of retention under a GPL regime. This is because the o¤er of a retention discount implies that in order to induce switching, it is necessary to o¤er very low prices to those consumers that are eager to switch.
Regarding, …rst-period prices an interesting …nding is that the …rst-period price with BBPD and retention strategies is below the uniform price. This result should be compared with …rst-period equilibrium price above the uniform price when BBPD is used without retention o¤ers. In general when …rms can engage in price discrimination based on purchase history there are two e¤ects on …rst-period prices: a consumer-side e¤ect and a …rm-side e¤ect. When consumers are non myopic they correctly anticipate the second period prices, become less price sensitive in period 1 and so there is a positive e¤ect on …rst-period prices. When …rms are forward looking, they also take into account that a change in …rst-period prices will a¤ect the second-period prices and pro…ts.
In the benchmark case of BBPD with no retention strategies a change of …rst-period prices has no e¤ect on second-period pro…t because with a uniform distribution a …rm's marginal gains in the second-period market are exactly o¤set by losses in the …rst-period market (
In this case the decrease in the price sensitivity of consumers in period 1 that occurs when we move from no discrimination to BBPD determines the result of …rst-period prices above the non-discrimination level.
Looking at the e¤ect of …rst-period prices on second-period pro…t when …rms can employ BBPD with retention o¤ers we …nd that in the symmetric equilibrium
< 0. This suggests that each …rm has a strategic incentive to enlarge its turf in period 1, which is achieved by competing more aggressively in that period. Therefore, in comparison to no-discrimination, …rms charge lower …rst-period prices when they can compete with BBPD and retention o¤ers because the …rm-side e¤ect is stronger than the consumer-side e¤ect.
Welfare analysis
This section investigates the welfare e¤ects of BBPD when …rms engage in a retention activity in an attempt to make it less attractive for a customer to switch to a competing …rm. We compare this possibility with two other price competition scenarios; the one where price discrimination is not permitted and the other where BBPD is permitted but retention o¤ers are not allowed. Let the superscript nd denote no discrimination; N R denote BBPD with no retention activity and R denote BBPD with retention discounts. Further, let ind denote industry pro…ts, CS denote consumer surplus and W denote overall welfare.
Proposition 5. For any > 0 is is always true:
Proposition 5 highlights that in comparison to uniform pricing, price discrimination based on purchase history is bad for pro…ts and overall welfare but good for consumers. However, conditional on BBPD being employed, the use of a retention strategy through a price discount o¤ered to those consumers showing an intention to switch boosts consumer surplus and overall welfare at the expense of industry pro…ts.
In order to discuss the impact of retention o¤ers for speci…c groups of consumers let we compare …rst BBPD with no retention activity with uniform pricing. In the FudenbergTirole model with the uniform, price discrimination has no e¤ect on consumer welfare for the consumers on the interval 0; ; 1 . These consumers do not switch in equilibrium and their present value payment for the two periods of consumption is the same in both pricing regimes, i.e., (1 + ) t: In contrast, consumers on the interval 1 3 ; 2 3 switch from one …rm to another and the present value of their payment is equal to (1 + ) t t 3
:
In comparison to no discrimination, the group of switchers is strictly better o¤ under BBPD with no retention strategies.
Look now at BBPD with retention o¤ers. Consumers on the intervals 0; ; 1 do not signal an intention to switch and as a result of that they face a higher second-period price. Their present value payment for the two periods of consumption is (1 + ) t 6 t 25 . Thus, the decrease in the …rst-period price more than compensates the second period loss, implying that the group of passive consumers is strictly better o¤ with BBPD and retention o¤ers than under no discrimination (where they pay (1 + ) t): Consumers on the intervals show an intention to switch but are retained. The present value of the price paid by these consumers in both periods is (1 + ) t
t 25
: These consumers are also clearly better o¤ when …rms employ BBPD with retention discounts. Consumers on the intervals decide not to switch when we move from BBPD alone to BBPD with retention o¤ers. The present value of their payment is equal to (1 + ) t 6 t 25 with retention discounts, while it is equal to (1 + ) t 3 t with no retention: Consequently, this group of consumers also bene…ts when …rms employ BBPD and retention discounts. Finally, the poached consumers on the interval switch from one …rm to another under retention strategies. The present value of the price paid by them for the two periods of consumption is equal to (1 + ) t
: Summing up, BBPD with retention strategies reduces the present value of the price paid by consumer in all segments, explaining that the use of BBPD with retention discounts under a LPL switching process can bene…t consumers in comparison to the case where retention is absent under the GPL regime.
Regarding the aggregate e¤ects on welfare, because in the present model there is no role for price discrimination to increase aggregate output, variations in welfare are uniquely explained by the "desutility" supported by those consumers who buy ine¢ ciently.
12 As retention discounts are used by …rms as an attempt to make it less attractive for a customer to switch to a rival …rm, a smaller number of consumers do in fact switch in equilibrium.
As a result of that in comparison to BBPD alone, BBPD with retention o¤ers boosts welfare because it gives rise to less ine¢ cient switching.
Conclusions
The economics literature on price discrimination by purchase history has hitherto focused on the assumption that (i) …rms have only the required information to price discriminate between old and new customers and that (ii) …rms have no way to react to the rivals' poaching o¤ers. Interestingly, in some of the markets where …rms often price discriminate between their own and the rivals'consumers, the switching processes currently in place in many countries have allowed …rms to become aware of an existing customer's willingness to leave before the switching takes place. Consequently, …rms have been increasingly able to recognize di¤erent categories of old customers those willing to stay and those willing to switch and try to raise the switching barriers by engaging in retention o¤ers. This paper has taken a …rst step in investigating the impact of behavior-based price discrimination in markets where …rms are allowed to try to retain their previous clientele, by o¤ering those showing an intention to switch a price discount.
In order to understand the implications of these business practice in asymmetric markets, we had looked at the static second-period analysis. It highlights that …rms will only o¤er retention discounts if their customer base is above a threshold (i.e., above 33%). Further, the static analysis also sheds some light on whether or not BBPD with retention strategies in a LPL regime helps a dominant …rm (with a market share above 50%) to maintain its dominant position. If BBPD is possible but retention activity is forbidden, the dominant …rm will lose its dominance under price discrimination. In contrast, if the dominant …rm is big enough (with a market share above 75%), although BBPD with retention o¤ers makes the market more competitive it allows the bigger …rm to maintain its dominance.
While the static analysis is a useful tool, the dynamic one is the most appropriate to inform competition authorities about the economic e¤ects of BBPD with retention o¤ers. Take into account the intertemporal e¤ects of BBPD with retention o¤ers, the paper shows that the …rst period equilibrium price with retention strategies is below its non-discrimination counterpart, which contrasts with …rst period price above the nondiscrimination level when these business strategies are forbidden. Regarding secondperiod prices, the possibility of …rm engaging in BBPD with retention o¤ers under a LPL switching regime, leads to higher prices to all consumers that do not switch compared to a GPL process. In contrast, the consumers that do switch get a lower price in a LPL switching regime with retention o¤ers than they would in the absence of retention under a GPL regime. In spite of this, we show that the present value of the price paid by consumers who do not switch is lower under BBPD with retention o¤ers under a LPL switching regime than when it is banned, suggesting that the higher second-period prices are more than compensated by the lower …rst-period price. In sum the paper shows that BBPD with retention strategies under a LPL switching regime, can reduce the present value of the price paid by consumers in all segments, compared to BBPD with no retention (GLP regime).
As in other models where consumers have stable exogenous brand preferences, in comparison to uniform pricing the instrument of BBPD is bad for pro…ts and welfare but good for consumers. The model predicts that industry pro…ts are lower and consumers' surplus and welfare is higher under LPL with retention o¤ers than under GPL without retention activity.
However, it is important to stress that the results obtained in this model should be interpreted with care. Like other models of BBPD, the model has some limitations. One limitation is the unit demand assumption.
13 In these models, output is constant whatever the pricing policy (discriminatory or uniform) and the price levels. Prices only a¤ect how the total surplus available in the economy is shared between consumers and …rms. A pricing policy that generates more switching will yield a lower welfare. As the present model predicts that the present value of the price paid by all consumer segments decreases with retention activity, extending the model by relaxing the unit demand assumption would produce the same qualitative welfare results. Another limitation is the assumption of preferences uniformly distributed. Extending the model to other distribution of consumer preferences would produce insights about the e¤ects of BBPD and retention o¤ers in markets characterized by a large tail of consumers with preferences for one of the …rms and a small tail of consumers with preferences for the other …rm. It is likely in this scenario industry pro…ts may be higher and consumers'surplus may be lower under retention o¤ers. It is therefore important to get a better understanding of brand loyalty and consumer inertia, in the markets under consideration if we are to gain a better understanding of the distribution of consumers'preference. Finally, this model assumed that …rms o¤er the same discount to all consumers expressing an intention to leave. In practice, …rms o¤er di¤erent discounts to consumers and these may be the outcome of a "bargaining process"which may be in ‡uenced by the consumer's level of brand loyalty.
Notwithstanding the model addressed in this paper is far from covering all complex aspects of real markets, it has tried to o¤er a closer approximation of reality where …rms have increasingly more consumer information to react to the rivals'poaching o¤ers. Al-though any advice to a policy agency should take into account the features of each market, in those markets that could be reasonably well represented by the features of the current model, restrictions on the ability of …rms to employ retention o¤ers through under a LPL switching process would bene…t industry pro…ts at the expense of consumer welfare.
A Proofs
Some of the proofs in this technical appendix need to be improved. 
This implies that at prices p and …rm B's best response is
It thus follows that
It is straightforward to obtain that the equilibrium prices in turf B are
Note however that it is a dominated strategy for each …rm to quote a poaching price below the marginal cost, which in this case is equal to zero. From p secondperiod equilibrium prices are
Similarly it is straightforward to …nd that if 1 3 4
This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. From these second-period equilibrium prices it is easy to obtain that each …rm second-period market share, s In the …rst stage of period 2 …rm A solves the following problem:
M ax Proof of Corollary 5. From the second-period equilibrium prices it is easy to obtain that second-period market shares are at the interior solution where Overall consumer surplus in each of the three pricing regimes is respectively given by Thus, for any > 0; it is straightforward to obtain (i), (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 5.
